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Abstract. Key establishment is a crucial primitive for building secure
channels in a multi-party setting. Without quantum mechanics, key es-
tablishment can only be done under the assumption that some com-
putational problem is hard. Since digital communication can be easily
eavesdropped and recorded, it is important to consider the secrecy of in-
formation anticipating future algorithmic and computational discoveries
which could break the secrecy of past keys, violating the secrecy of the
confidential channel.
Quantum key distribution (QKD) can be used generate secret keys that
are secure against any future algorithmic or computational improve-
ments. QKD protocols still require authentication of classical commu-
nication, although existing security proofs of QKD typically assume ide-
alized authentication. It is generally considered folklore that QKD when
used with computationally secure authentication is still secure against
an unbounded adversary, provided the adversary did not break the au-
thentication during the run of the protocol.
We describe a security model for quantum key distribution extending
classical authenticated key exchange (AKE) security models. Using our
model, we characterize the long-term security of the BB84 QKD pro-
tocol with computationally secure authentication against an eventually
unbounded adversary. By basing our model on traditional AKE mod-
els, we can more readily compare the relative merits of various forms of
QKD and existing classical AKE protocols. This comparison illustrates
in which types of adversarial environments different quantum and clas-
sical key agreement protocols can be secure.
Keywords: quantum key distribution, authenticated key exchange,
cryptographic protocols, security models
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1 Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises new security properties compared to
cryptography based on computational assumptions: two parties can establish a
key using a pair of quantum and classical channels, secure against any adversary
who is limited solely by the laws of quantum mechanics. Most information-
theoretically secure classical5 cryptographic tasks have limited practicality, so
many schemes’ security rely on computational assumptions, the most widely used
of which—factoring, discrete logarithms—could be efficiently solved by a large-
scale quantum computer. As a result, QKD could be an important primitive
for cryptography secure against advances in computing technology, provided
quantum mechanics remains an accurate description of the laws of nature.
The classical cryptographic literature has extensively studied authenticated
key exchange (AKE) since the founding of public key cryptography in 1976. After
a period of ad hoc security analysis, protocols are now generally analyzed in a
security model where an active attacker controls communication and can possibly
compromise certain private information; proofs usually consist of probabilistic
reductions to computationally hard problems. The seminal work in this area
by Bellare and Rogaway [1] was followed by the more modern CK01 [2] and
eCK [3] models; an alternative approach to this family of security models is
given by Canetti’s universal composability (UC) framework [4]. Typically in AKE
protocols, calculating a secret key is relatively easy, but authentication—ensuring
that the key is shared only with only the intended party—requires greater care.
There are many types of QKD protocols, but for our purposes we will divide
them into 3 classes: prepare-send-measure protocols, measure-only protocols, and
prepare-send-only protocols. The first QKD protocol, now called BB84 [5], is an
example of a prepare-send-measure protocol in which Alice randomly prepares
one of several quantum states, sends it to Bob, and Bob randomly measures
in one of several settings. Ekert [6] proposed an entanglement-based protocol,
which is an example of a measure-only protocol: Alice and Bob only randomly
measure in one of several settings; the state itself can be prepared by Eve entirely
untrusted. Biham et al. [7] proposed a prepare-send-only protocol, in which Alice
and Bob each randomly prepare one of several quantum states and send them
to Eve, who measures and sends back a classical result. Different versions can
be appealing due to ease of implementation, resistance to side-channel attacks
on preparing or measuring, or device independence.
Research on QKD security has largely proceeded independent of the afore-
mentioned classical AKE security models. Various proofs of QKD have been
given in a stand-alone 2-party setting [8,9,10,11,12,13,14]. This contrasts with
the aforementioned security models used in classical AKE protocols, which con-
sider the multi-party, multi-session setting, and consider various types of infor-
mation leakage or compromise. Existing QKD proofs typically take place under
the assumption that classical communication happens over on authentic public
5 We use the adjective “classical” to mean “non-quantum”, so “classical cryptography”
means “non-quantum cryptography”, not “historical cryptography”.
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channel. It is generally considered folklore [15,16,17,18] that if QKD was per-
formed using a computationally secure message authentication scheme (such as
public key digital signatures), then messages encrypted under the keys output
by QKD would be secure provided that the adversary could not break the au-
thentication scheme before or during the QKD protocol. This result has only
been justified formally in this paper and in our concurrent work by Unruh in
the universal composability setting [19].
Contributions. Our goal is to describe the security of quantum key distribution
in a security model similar to existing classical authenticated key exchange pro-
tocols and compare the relative security properties of various QKD and classical
AKE protocols. Our model is explicitly a multi-party model, includes authenti-
cation, and allows for either computationally secure or information theoretically
secure authentication. We aim to capture two properties: (1) QKD is immedi-
ately secure against an active adversary who is restricted such that he is unable
to break the authentication scheme, and (2) QKD is long-term secure, meaning
that, if it is secure against an active adversary who is restricted during the run
of the protocol to be unable to break the authentication scheme, then it re-
mains secure even when the (classical and quantum) data obtained by the active
bounded adversary are later given to an unbounded quantum adversary.
Security model for classical-quantum AKE protocols. We first introduce in
Section 2 a multi-party model for analyzing the security of QKD protocols. In
our model, which adopts the formalism of Goldberg et al.’s framework for AKE
[20], parties consist of a pair of classical and quantum Turing machines, each of
which is capable of sending and receiving messages. The adversary controls all
communications between parties, but is restricted in its ability to affect commu-
nication between a party’s classical and quantum devices. The adversary also
has the ability to compromise various values used by parties before, during, or
after the run of the protocol. As is typical, the adversary’s goal is to distinguish
the session key of a completed session from a random string of the same length.
A novelty of our approach is a new technique for defining matching sessions.
Having defined the adversarial model, we then introduce our two security
definitions, immediate security against an active, potentially bounded adversary,
and long-term security, against an adversary who during the run of the protocol
may be bounded, but after the protocol completes is unbounded (except by the
laws of quantum mechanics). Our model is generic enough to allow the bound on
the adversary to be computational—assuming that a particular computational
problem is hard—or run-time or memory-bounded [21]. We adapt the long-term
security notion of Mu¨ller-Quade and Unruh [22] from the classical universal
composability framework to our classical-quantum model.
Security of BB84. We then proceed in Section 3 to show that the BB84 pro-
tocol, when used with a computationally secure classical authentication scheme
such as a digital signature, is secure in this model. For the quantum aspects of
the proof, we rely on existing proof techniques. This is next extended to pro-
vide a proof of the folklore theorem that QKD, when used with computationally
secure authentication in a multi-party setting, is information theoretically se-
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cure, provided the adversary did not break the authentication during the run of
the protocol. Our argument explicitly identifies which secret information leakage
does not affect security either before or after the run of the protocol.
Comparison of quantum and classical AKE protocols. Finally, we use our
generic security model to compare in Section 4 the security properties of classi-
cal key exchange protocols and examples from each of the three classes of QKD
protocols (prepare-send-measure, measure-only, prepare-send-only). This com-
parison is facilitated by our phrasing of QKD in a security model more closely
related to traditional AKE security models, which we can then use to compare
the relative powers afforded to the adversary under those models. In particular,
our model allows us to compare how different protocols react when the ran-
domness used in the protocol is revealed—or if it is later discovered that bad
randomness was used. For example, some classical AKE protocols such as UP
[23] are secure even if the randomness used for either a party’s long-term secret
key or ephemeral secret key is revealed before the run of the protocol, but the
same is not true for the randomness used to pick basis choices in BB84. And the
EPR protocol of Ekert is secure even if all of the randomness used by the parties
is leaked after the protocol completes, unlike BB84 where data bit choices must
remain secret. Since obtaining high quality randomness can be very challenging
in practice—requiring either a separate, tested quantum source, or relying on a
pseudorandom number generator seeded from a high quality source of entropy—
it may be desirable to select a protocol based on the quality of randomness
available, and our framework provides a method for comparing protocols along
these lines.
Comparison with other frameworks. Our approach to defining security differs
from existing work in several essential ways. Stand-alone QKD security defi-
nitions do not consider the security in a multi-party setting, and also tend to
ignore entirely the question of explicit authentication, instead assuming an au-
thentic classical channel. It is widely recognized that the authentication can be
secure against an unbounded adversary if all classical communication is pro-
tected by information-theoretically secure message authentication codes, such
as the Wegman-Carter 2-universal hash function [24,25]. However, as mentioned
above, the classical AKE experience suggests that it is the authentication part
of the overall security definition that is often violated; more so when there is
information leakage to adversary. With a few exceptions (e.g., [13]), stand-alone
definitions also exclude the possibility of the adversary learning private infor-
mation. The universal composability definition of QKD security of Ben-Or et
al. [26] (which is an adaptation of Canetti’s UC framework [4] to the quantum
setting), notably referenced by Renner in his thesis [14], also brushes aside the
possibility of any information being leaked to the adversary and focuses solely
on information-theoretic authentication. Other frameworks for composability of
quantum protocols have been given [27,28,29,30,31] and applied to other types
of cryptographic protocols, but not QKD. Our model, then, is the first to define
QKD security in the multi-party setting, with explicit consideration of authenti-
cation, allowing leakage of information the adversary. Moreover, it defines both
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short-term and long-term security; last but not least our definitions paves way for
formally analyzing and comparing both classical and quantum AKE protocols
within the same framework. In work concurrent with our, Unruh [19] analyzes
the long-term security of QKD in the UC framework.
2 QKD model
Our model begins as an enhancement to the eCK model [3], following the nota-
tion of Goldberg et al. [20]. In our model, each party has access to a quantum
device. The quantum device may be viewed as limited based on for example cur-
rent hardware limitations. As usual we consider interactive protocols within a
multi-party multi-session setting, where communication is controlled by the ad-
versary. The adversary controls the quantum communication channel between
parties, subject to the laws of quantum physics. We also describe how, if at all,
the adversary may gain access to secrets used by the parties. We then define
secrecy against bounded adversaries and long-term security against unbounded
adversaries: the long-term security definition is achieved by having the active
bounded short-term adversary output a classical and quantum transcript upon
which the unbounded quantum adversary may operate.
We next formally describe the model. We use k to denote a security param-
eter. Our description uses qubits but can be generalized to arbitrary-dimension
quantum systems.
2.1 Parties and protocols
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(b) Classical Turing machine
Fig. 1. A party’s classical and
quantum Turing machines
A party (see also [32, Def. 1.1, bullet 2]) is an
interactive classical Turing machine with access
to a quantum Turing machine. We refer to this
pair jointly as the party.
The classical machine can activate the quan-
tum device via a special activation request or re-
ceive (via designated activation routines) mea-
surement outcomes from the quantum device.
The communication is delivered over a two way
classical communication tape (the e-channel in
Figure 1(b)). The classical Turing machine has
also access to a sequence of random bits – the
r-tape in Figure 1(b) – and a separate c-tape
over which the party can receive and send other
activation requests and messages as specified by designated routines. Similarly,
the quantum Turing device can be activated by the classical Turing machine
and can receive and send qubits over a designated quantum channel q as in
Figure 1(a).
Each party can have associated authenticated public strings (e.g., public keys
or identifiers), which are assumed to be distributed over an authenticated channel
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to other parties. Furthermore, pairs of parties may possess shared secrets that
were distributed confidentially a priori.
A protocol is a collection of interactive classical and quantum subroutines
that produce a shared secret key between two (or more parties) or output an
indicator of an error. The interactions may use messages received on either the
classical or quantum channels. The final output of the protocol is made via the
classical Turing machine.
A session is an execution of the protocol. Sessions are initiated via a special
incoming request and upon initiation each one is identified with a unique6 session
identifier Ψ chosen by the party at which the session is executed (in which case
we say the party owns the session). A session that has been initiated but is not
yet completed is called active. Since sessions are interactive procedures a party
may own more than one active session at a given point of time. Each active
session has a separate session state that stores session-specific classical data.7
Upon receiving and sending all protocol messages and performing the re-
quired measurements and computations specified by the protocol, the session
completes by having the classical Turing machine output either an error symbol
⊥ or a tuple (sk, pid,v,u). The tuple consists of:
– sk: a session key;
– pid: a party identifier;
– v: a vector (v0,v1, . . . ) where each vi is a vector of public values or labels;
(For example, v1 may consist of the public values contributed by party P1.
Including v in the session output binds the session with the various values
used by the parties to compute the session key.)
– u: a vector (u0,u1, . . . ) where each ui is vector of a public values or labels;
u is called the authentication vector and indicates what the session owner
uses to identify its peer pid.
The vectors v and u will play an important role in defining freshness.
Definition 1 (Correctness). A key exchange protocol pi is correct if, when all
protocol messages are relayed faithfully, without changes to content or ordering,
the peer parties output the same session key k and the same vector v.
Memory. A party may hold in its memory several value pairs of the form (x,X),
generated by some algorithm specified by the protocol, where x is a private value
and X is a public value or label. The pair may be a public key pair, such as private
key x and public key X, or a labelled private value, such as a private value x and
a unique public label X = `(x).
6 With this definition uniqueness is guaranteed only within a party; globally unique-
ness can be guaranteed by requiring the session identifier is the concatenation of the
unique party identifier and the party’s own session identifier.
7 While quantum protocols in general may make use of quantum memory for storing
quantum states during a session, the current QKD protocols we consider in this
paper, such as BB84 or EPR, do not, so we omit this from our model.
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There are two classifications of value pairs: ephemeral value pairs, which
are associated with a particular session Ψ, and static value pairs, which can be
used across multiple sessions. The party may also have value pairs that have
been generated but not yet used. If necessary, different types of key pairs may
be permitted, for example, if a protocol uses one type of key pair for digital
signatures and another type of key pair for public-key encryption. The protocol
specifies an algorithm for generating new pairs.
Classical Turing machine communication. As described above each classical Tur-
ing machine has two incoming-outgoing classical communication channels, de-
noted by e and c in Figure 1(b), over which the classical Turing machine receives
activations and submits responses. The responses themselves can be activation
requests. Furthermore the classical Turing machine has an input of classical
random bits which can be read at will by the Turing machine, denoted by r
in Figure 1(b). The following activations of the classical Turing machine are
allowed:
– SendC(params, pid): This activation is received via channel c and directs
the party to begin a new key exchange session. A new session is initiated
and assigned a unique session identifier Ψ based on protocol-specific public
parameters params and an identifier pid of the party with whom to establish
the session. The response to this query includes the session identifier Ψ and
any protocol-specific outgoing classical message msg′ that are sent via the
outgoing channel c. If required by the protocol, the Turing machine can send
an activation request C2Q(m) over the e outgoing channel, which may in turn
cause that quantum Turing machine to write an output to its q channel as
well, or to prepare its measurement device to receive quantum messages.
– SendC(Ψ,msg): This query models the delivery of classical messages over
c-channel. The party’s classical Turing machine is activated with session Ψ
and classical message msg. It returns any outgoing classical message msg′
over the c-channel. If required by the protocol, the Turing machine can send
an activation request C2Q(m) over the e outgoing channel, which may in
turn cause that quantum Turing machine to write an output to its q channel
as well, or to prepare its measurement device to receive quantum messages.
– Q2C(m): Upon activation with this query the classical Turing machine acti-
vates its most recent session with input m. This query may cause the classical
Turing machine to output to its c channel, or send another activation over
the e channel.
A protocol may request that the classical Turing machine acts probabilisti-
cally, in which case it reads random bits from the r-channel.
Quantum Turing machine communication. Each party’s quantum Turing ma-
chine has a two-way quantum communication channel, denoted by q in Fig-
ure 1(a), over which the machine receives and submits quantum information.
The responses themselves can be activation requests. Furthermore the quan-
tum Turing machine has a two-way classical control channel (denoted by e in
Figure 1(a)) with which it communicates with the classical Turing machine.
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The following activations of the quantum Turing machine are allowed:
– SendQ(ρ): This query activates the quantum Turing machine with quantum
message ρ; it returns any outgoing quantum message ρ′ over the q-channel. If
required by the protocol, the quantum Turing machine can send an activation
request C2Q(m) over the e outgoing channel (for example, to report any
measurement results obtained from measuring ρ), which may in turn cause
that classical Turing machine to write an output to its c channel as well.
– C2Q(m): This query activates the quantum Turing machine with classical
control message m, for example to prepare the quantum circuit for execution
due to an anticipated SendQ activation. The activation may cause a quantum
state to be output over the outgoing quantum channel q as well as a classical
message to be returned over classical control channel e.
2.2 Adversarial model
The adversary is, similar to a party, a pair of interactive classical and quantum
Turing machines. The adversary’s classical Turing machine runs in time at most
tc(k) and has access to a quantum Turing machine with runtime bounded by
tq(k) and memory bounded by mq(k) qubits; bounds may be unlimited. The
adversary takes as its input all public information and may interact with the
(honest) parties. Furthermore the adversary can establish corrupted (dishonest)
parties which it fully controls. Honest parties cannot distinguish between honest
and dishonest parties.
Communication over the parties’ classical c-channels is controlled by the ad-
versary. On the classical channels, the adversary can read, copy, reorder, insert,
delay, modify, drop or forward messages at will. The sending and receiving par-
ties have no intrinsic mechanism to detect which actions, if any, the adversary
performed on the classical messages.
Communication over the parties’ quantum q channels is also controlled by
the adversary. The adversary’s operations on the quantum channels are bound
by the laws of quantum mechanics: the delivery of quantum messages can be
delayed, modified in order, forwarded, or dropped; the adversary can create new
quantum states and perform joint quantum operations on quantum messages
received from the parties as well as on the adversary’s state. However, due to
the laws of quantum mechanics, the adversary cannot necessarily obtain full
information about quantum messages from the parties; for example, measure-
ments may irrevocably disturb the state of messages transmitted by the parties,
and the adversary may be unable to precisely copy a message due to the no-
cloning theorem. We assume communication between the adversary’s quantum
machine and party’s quantum machines is perfect: the adversary can simulate
any environmental effect or noise on qubits sent by a party.
Queries. The adversary can direct a party to perform certain actions by sending
any of the aforementioned activation queries over party’s the c and q channels.
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The adversary has neither immediate control and cannot observe the content ex-
changed between the classical and quantum subcomponents of a party over the
e channel, nor has information about the bits obtained from the r-channel. Fur-
thermore, to allow for information leakage the adversary may issue the following
queries to parties:
– RevealNext → X: This query allows the adversary to activate the classical
Turing machine to read input from the r-channel and learn future public
values. The activated party generates a new value pair (x,X), records it as
unused, and returns the public value X. (This query may be specialized if
there are multiple value pair types specified by the protocol.)
– Reveal(X)→ x: This query allows the adversary to compromise secret values
used in the protocol computation.8 If the party has a value pair (x,X) in
its memory, it returns the private value x. Reveal(Ψ) returns the secret key
sk for session Ψ, if it exists; this is often referred to as a RevealSessionKey
query.
Where necessary to avoid ambiguity, we use a superscript to indicate the
party to whom the query is directed, for example SendCPi(Ψ,msg).
Revealing. If (x,X) is a value pair, with public key value or public label X, then
the adversary is said to have revealed the secret for X if the adversary issued the
query Reveal(X) to a party holding that value pair in its memory. In general, the
adversary can reveal the secret for any value X, though this may affect which
sessions are fresh.
2.3 Security definition
For the purpose of defining session key security, the adversary has access to the
following additional oracle:
– Test(i,Ψ)→ κ: If party Pi has not output a session key, return ⊥. Otherwise,
choose b
$← {0, 1}. If b = 1, then return the session key sk from the output
for session Ψ at party Pi. If b = 0, return a random bit string of length equal
to the length of the session key sk in session Ψ at party Pi. Only one call to
the Test query is allowed.
Definition 2 (Fresh session). A session Ψ owned by an honest party Pi is
fresh if all of the following occur:
1. For every vector vj in Pi’s output for session Ψ, there is at least one element
X in vj for which the adversary has not revealed the secret.
2. The adversary did not issue Reveal(Ψ′) to any honest party Pj for which Ψ′
has the same public output vector as Ψ (including the case where Ψ′ = Ψ
and Pj = Pi).
8 Our notation here is altered from that of Goldberg et al. [20], in that we call this
query Reveal instead of their original term Partner.
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3. At the time of session completion, for every vector uj, j ≥ 1, in Pi’s output
for session Ψ, there was at least one element X in uj for which the adversary
has not revealed the secret.
The difference between the first condition (involving v) and the third con-
dition (involving u) is that there are some values (u) that are okay for the
adversary to learn after the session completes but not before, whereas there may
be other values (v) that he can never learn.
Definition 3 (Security). Let k be a security parameter. An authenticated key
exchange protocol is secure if, for all adversaries A with classical runtime bounded
by tc(k), quantum runtime bounded by tq(k), and quantum memory bounded by
mq(k), the advantage of A in guessing the bit b used in the Test query of a fresh
session is negligible in k; in other words, the probability that A can distinguish
the session key of a fresh session from a random string of the same length is
negligible.
Output vectors. One of the key differences between our model and traditional
AKE security models is how we phrase restrictions on what secret values the
adversary can learn and when. In the eCK model, for example, a fresh session
is defined as one in which the adversary has not learned (a) both the session
owner’s ephemeral secret key x and long-term secret key a, and (b) both the
peer’s ephemeral secret key y and long-term secret key b (or just the peer’s long-
term key if no matching peer session exists). In our model, this could be specified
as v = (v0 = (a, x),v1 = (b, y)).
Since in traditional AKE security models the restriction on values learned is
specified in the security model, a new security model is required for each differing
combination of learnable values. Though models may often appear similar, they
sometimes contain subtle but important formal differences and thus become
formally incomparable [33]. The traditional approach of specifying the values
that can or cannot be learned in the security definition itself contrasts with our
approach—building on that of Goldberg et al. [20]—where the vectors v and u
in the session output specify what can or cannot be learned. As a result, two
protocols with differing restrictions on values that can be learned could both be
proven secure in our model and then compared based on which values can or
cannot be revealed.
2.4 Long-term security
One of the main benefits of quantum key distribution is that it can be secure
against unbounded adversaries, but this comes at the cost of being unable to
use computationally secure cryptographic primitives such as public key digital
signatures for authentication. Definition 3 can be used to analyze QKD when
computationally secure cryptographic primitives are used by choosing a tc(k),
tq(k), and mq(k) such that the cryptographic primitive is believed secure against
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such an adversary. The particular values may be chosen based on known classi-
cal algorithms for factoring or discrete logarithms and on present-day limits of
quantum devices.
Regardless of the bound on the active adversary, we can still recover a very
strong form of long-term security by considering an unbounded quantum Turing
machine acting after the protocol has completed. In other words, during the
run of the protocol, we assume a bounded adversary as in Definition 3; this
bounded active adversary produces some classical and quantum transcript which
it provides to the unbounded adversary. This models the real-world scenario of
an adversary being somewhat limited by its classical and quantum computing
equipment now but later having much more powerful equipment or making an
algorithmic breakthrough.
Definition 4 (Long-term security). An AKE protocol is long-term secure
if, for all unbounded quantum Turing machines M acting on a classical and
quantum transcript produced by a (bounded) adversary A in Definition 3, the
advantage of M in guessing the bit b used in the Test query of a fresh session is
negligible in the security parameter.
Bounds on devices. If tq(k) = mq(k) = 0, and Definition 4 is omitted, the model
reduces to a classical definition for secure session key establishment. It refines
the idea of authentication as the session output can explicitly identify how peers
were identified and authenticated. Thus any classical protocol analyzed in [20]
can also be analyzed in this model.
This model can be used in conjunction with present limitations of quantum
devices. While there are ongoing improvements in controlling quantum systems,
at present the number of qubits a device can work with is essentially a small con-
stant compared to classical computers. Thus, using our model with appropriate
values of tq(k) and mq(k), one can devise efficient protocols that are easy to im-
plement but guarantee unconditional future secrecy. An appropriate assumption
on tc(k)—for example that all adversaries with polynomial running time tc(k)
cannot solve a particular hard problem—allow the model to be used as existing
classical reductionist security models are used.
Of course, the devices available to the adversary can be made unbounded
essentially allowing a complete quantum world. Thus the definitions presented
here are suitable for analyzing novel QKD protocols. These alternatives show the
wide range of scenarios our definitions incorporate. Due to the unified underlying
framework it is easier to compare various protocols and decide which one is the
best for the task at hand.
3 BB84
We now turn to the BB84 protocol [5]. We first specify the protocol in the
language of the model of Section 2, discuss some aspects of our formulation,
and complete the section with a security analysis. Our presentation of BB84
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explicitly includes the authentication operations. We choose to focus on authen-
tication using digital signatures, rather than authentication using symmetric key
primitives, for several reasons: first, establishment of shared secret keys for au-
thentication is in practice harder than authentic distribution of public keys; and
second, the short-term and long-term security properties resulting from the use
of public key authentication with QKD are not yet understood.
Definition 5. Let k be a security parameter. The BB84 protocol is defined by
having parties responding to activations as follows:
1. Upon activation SendC(start, initiator, B) the classical Turing machine A does
the following:
(a) create a new session ΨA with peer identifier B;
(b) read n1 (random) data bits Ψ
A
dAB and n1 (random) basis bits Ψ
A
bA from its
r-tape;
(c) send activation C2Q(ΨAbA,Ψ
A
dAB) on its e-tape, which indicates that the quan-
tum device should encode each data bit from ΨAdAB as |0〉 or |1〉 if the corre-
sponding basis bit ΨAbA is 0, or as |+〉 or |−〉 if the corresponding basis bit ΨAbA
is 1;
(d) send activation SendC(ΨA, start, responder, A) on its c-tape to B.
2. Upon activation SendC(ΨA, start, responder, A) the classical Turing machine B
does the following:
(a) create a new session ΨB with peer identifier A;
(b) read n1 (random) basis bits Ψ
B
bB from its r-tape;
(c) send activation C2Q(ΨBbB) on its e-tape, which indicates the quantum device
should measure the ith qubit in the |0〉/|1〉 if the ith bit of ΨBbB is 0, or in the
|+〉/|−〉 basis if ith bit of ΨBbB is 1.
3. Upon activation Q2C(m), the classical Turing machine B does the following:
(a) set ΨBdAB equal to m;
(b) compute σ ← SignpkB (ΨA,ΨB ,ΨBbB , B);
(c) send activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB ,ΨBbB , σ) on its c-tape to A.
4. Upon activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB ,ΨBbB , σ), the classical Turing machine A does the
following:
(a) verify σ with pkB ;
(b) discard all bit positions from ΨAdAB for which Ψ
A
bA is not equal to Ψ
B
bB ; assume
n2 such positions remain;
(c) read n2 (random) bits Ψ
A
indAB from its r-tape; set Ψ
A
chkAB to be the substring
of ΨAdAB for which the bits of Ψ
A
indAB are 1, and set Ψ
A
kAB to be the substring
of ΨAdAB for which the bits of Ψ
A
indAB are 0; let n3 denote the length of Ψ
A
kAB
(d) compute σ ← SignpkA(ΨA,ΨB ,ΨAbA,ΨAindAB ,ΨAchkAB , A);
(e) send activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB ,ΨAbA,Ψ
A
indAB ,Ψ
A
chkAB , σ) on its c-tape to B.
5. Upon activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB ,ΨAindAB ,Ψ
A
chkAB , σ), the classical Turing machine
B does the following:
(a) verify σ with pkA;
(b) discard all bit positions from ΨBdAB for which Ψ
A
bA is not equal to Ψ
B
bB
(c) set ΨBchkAB to be the substring of Ψ
B
dAB for which the bits of Ψ
A
indAB are 1,
and set ΨBkAB to be the substring of Ψ
B
dAB for which the bits of Ψ
A
indAB are 0
(d) let  be the proportion of bits of ΨAchkAB that do not match Ψ
B
chkAB ; if  > 0.061
then abort;
(e) compute σ ← SignpkB (ΨA,ΨB , , B);
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(f) send activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB , , σ) on its c-tape to A.
6. Upon activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB , , σ), the classical Turing machine A does the fol-
lowing:
(a) verify σ with pkB ;
(b) read (random) bits ΨAF from its r-tape to construct a random a 2-universal hash
function F : {0, 1}n3 → {0, 1}r′ (where r′ = n3h() + o(n3)) for information
reconciliation9 and compute F ′ = F (ΨAkAB);
(c) read (random) bits ΨAP,G from its r-tape to generate a random permutation P
on n3 elements and a 2-universal hash function G : {0, 1}n3 → {0, 1}s′ (where
s′ = n3(1 − 3h()) + o(n3)) for privacy amplification, respectively; compute
ΨAskAB ← G(P (ΨAkAB));
(d) compute σ ← SignpkA(ΨA,ΨB , F, F ′, P,G,A);
(e) send activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB , F, F ′, P,G, σ) on its c-tape to B;
(f) output (sk = ΨAskAB , pid = B,v = (v0 = (`(Ψ
A
dAB)),v1 = (`(Ψ
A
bAB)),v2 =
(`(ΨBdAB)),v3 = (`(Ψ
B
bAB)),v4 = (`(Ψ
A
F )),v5 = (`(Ψ
A
P,G))),u = (u1 = (pkB)))
(recall `(·) denotes the label describing the corresponding secret value).
7. Upon activation SendC(ΨA,ΨB , F, F ′, P,G, σ), the classical Turing machineB does
the following:
(a) verify σ with pkA;
(b) use F and F ′ to correct ΨBkAB to Ψ
B
kAB′ ;
(c) compute ΨBskAB ← G(P (ΨBkAB′));
(d) output (sk = ΨBskAB , pid = A,v = (v0 = (`(Ψ
A
dAB)),v1 = (`(Ψ
A
bAB)),v2 =
(`(ΨBdAB)),v3 = (`(Ψ
B
bAB)),v4 = (`(Ψ
A
F )),v5 = (`(Ψ
A
P,G)), ),u = (u1 =
(pkA))).
Remark 1. In the output vector v, the values `(ΨAbAB), `(Ψ
B
bAB), `(Ψ
A
F ), and
`(ΨAP,G) appear as single component vectors. But in step 6(e) the values are
broadcast in the clear. This may seem a bit contradictory since, if the adver-
sary has revealed the secret for either of those values (and therefore learns their
content), the session is not fresh, but because of the broadcast the adversary
does in fact learn the values corresponding to the aforementioned labels. The
important distinction is when the adversary obtains these values, either before
or after the protocol commences and measurements are performed. For the ad-
versary to learn these values before parties’ measurements, it must reveal the
secret for these values, violating session freshness. Learning the values after the
session completes is not an issue and the values are given to the adversary “for
free”, without the need for revealing the secrets.
Remark 2. The output vector u represents the values which the session owner
uses to authenticate its peer. Similar to `(ΨAbAB) the authentication information
has to be exclusively available to the alleged peer, but only at the time of protocol
execution: they may subsequently be revealed.
Observe that for the BB84 protocol above, Alice’s own authentication secret
pkA is not included in her u or v vectors. This implies that the protocol is
resilient to key compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks [35, §2.4.2]: even with
Alice’s authentication keys no party is able to pretend to be someone other than
Alice to Alice.
9 For details on information reconciliation and privacy amplification, see the full ver-
sion [34, Appendix A].
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3.1 Security of BB84
We now show that the BB84 protocol stated above is a secure (Theorem 1) and
long-term-secure (Theorem 2) AKE protocol assuming that the bounded active
adversary cannot break the signature scheme.
Theorem 1 (Security of BB84). Let k be a security parameter. Suppose that
the probability sig that any probabilistic polynomial time classical Turing ma-
chine with oracle access to a (tq(k),mq(k))-bounded quantum Turing machine
can break the signature scheme is negligible in k. Then the BB84 protocol is a
secure AKE protocol (Definition 3).
Proof sketch. Our proof combines an existing proof of security by Christandl
et al. [36] for the BB84 protocol with the sequence-of-games technique of Shoup
[37]. First we show—using techniques from classical reductionist security—that
no bounded adversary can (except with negligible probability) successfully tam-
per with the classical authenticated communication. Then we show—using tech-
niques from QKD security proofs—that the adversary cannot distinguish the key
from random. Details appear in the full version [34].
Theorem 2 (Long-term security of BB84). Let k be a security parameter.
Suppose the signature scheme is secure against all bounded adversaries as spec-
ified in Theorem 1. Then the BB84 protocol is a long-term secure authenticated
key exchange protocol (Definition 4).
Proof. The argument in fact appears in the proof of Theorem 1. In its proof, the
bounds on tc(k), tq(k), and mq(k) and on the adversary are required only for
guaranteeing the authenticity and origin of messages in a game hop that assures
that the classical authentic communication has not been tampered with. The
remainder of the argument is a typical argument for a quantum key distribution
scheme, which does not require any bounds on the adversarial power. Since
the unbounded adversary runs after the protocol completes, meaning it cannot
inject reorder or modify messages in the transcript, therefore the past classical
communication remains authentic and the result follows.
4 Comparing classical and quantum key exchange
protocols
Given the similarity of our model for both classical and quantum AKE protocols
to existing classical AKE security models and our model’s flexibility in analyzing
the security of a variety of protocols, we can use our model to identify qualitative
differences between classes of protocols.
One of the key differences between existing AKE security models such as
CK01 and eCK is what randomness the adversary is allowed reveal—and when—
yet still have the protocol be secure. Our framework is more generic: it is not the
model that specifies which randomness can be revealed but the protocol itself in
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Table 1. Comparison of security properties of various classical and quantum AKE
protocols.
Protocol
Signed Diffie– UP BB84 EPR BHM96
Hellman [2] [23] [5] [6] [7,12]
Protocol type
classical classical
quantum quantum quantum
prepare-send-measure measure-only prepare-send-only
Security model
CK01 [2]
eCK [3],
this paper this paper this paper
this paper
Randomness × static key at most 1 of × static key × static key × static key
revealable before × ephemeral key static key, × basic choice × basis choice × basis choice
protocol run? ephemeral key × data bits × data bits
× info. recon. × info. recon. × info. recon.
× priv. amp. × priv. amp. × priv. amp.
Randomness X static key at most 1 of X static key X static key X static key
revealable after × ephemeral key static key, X basis choice X basis choice X basis choice
protocol run? ephemeral key × data bits × data bits
X info. recon. X info. recon. X info. recon.
X priv. amp. X priv. amp. X priv. amp.
Short-term security computational computational computational computational computational
assumption assumption or inf.-th. or inf.-th. or inf.-th.
Long-term security
× × X X Xw/short-term-secure
authentication
its output vectors v and u. As a result, we can “compare” protocols by viewing
them all within our model and then comparing which values are included in the
output vector.10
Table 1 summarizes the observations of this section. We compare two quali-
tatively different classical AKE protocols and three qualitatively different QKD
protocols: (1) the signed Diffie–Hellman protocol [2] (which can be proven secure
in the CK01 model), (2) the UP protocol [23], a variant of the MQV protocol [38]
which can be proven secure in the eCK model, (3) the BB84 [5] prepare-send-
measure QKD protocol, (4) the EPR [6] (entanglement-based) measure-only
QKD protocol, and (5) the BHM96 [7,12] prepare-send-only QKD protocol. Our
model is flexible enough to allow all these protocols to be proven secure in it, of
course with different cryptographic assumptions, bounds on the adversary, and
different output vectors, which we compare in Table 1.
Revealing randomness before the run of the protocol. Some classical AKE
protocols, especially eCK-secure protocols such as UP and similar MQV-style
protocols, remain secure even if the adversary learns either the ephemeral secret
key or the long-term secret key, but not both, before the run of the protocol. This
contrasts with all known QKD protocols, where none of the random values—the
long-term secret key, the basis choices (for measure protocols), data bits (for
prepare protocols), information reconciliation function, or privacy amplification
function—can be revealed to the adversary in advance. (This is why all of these
values are included individually in the output vector v in the BB84 specification
in Section 3.)
Revealing randomness after the run of the protocol. For classical AKE proto-
cols to remain secure, at least some secret values must not be revealed after the
10 We note that it has been shown [33] that the CK01 and eCK models are formally
incomparable, meaning neither can be shown to imply the other.
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run of the protocol. For protocols with so-called perfect forward secrecy, such as
signed Diffie–Hellman, the parties’ long-term secret keys can be corrupted after
the run of the protocol, but not the ephemeral secret keys. For eCK-secure proto-
cols such as MQV-style protocols like UP, either the long-term or the ephemeral
secret key, but not both, can be revealed before, during, or after the protocol run.
For measure-only entanglement-based QKD protocols such as EPR, all random
choices made by the parties can be revealed after the run of the protocol: this is
because the key bits are not chosen by the parties, nor in fact by the adversary,
but are the result of measurements and (after successful privacy amplification)
are uncorrelated with any of the input bits of any of the parties, including the
adversary. This is not the case for prepare-and-send protocols such as BB84 or
BHM96, as the sender randomly chooses data bits which must remain secret.
Short-term and long-term security. Classical AKE protocols can be proven
secure only under computational assumptions, and as such only offer short-term
security in the sense of Definition 3. Even against an unbounded passive ad-
versary they do not retain any of their secrecy properties. Thus classical AKE
protocols are only secure against bounded short-term adversaries; however, they
can be compared on the relative strength of the bound on the adversary. This
contrasts with QKD protocols. QKD can be shown to be secure against either un-
bounded short-term adversaries, by using information-theoretic authentication,
or secure against bounded short-term adversaries when using a computationally
secure authentication scheme as we have shown for BB84 in Section 3.1. A key
contribution of the model in Section 2 is a formalism which captures the notion
that QKD can remain secure against an unbounded adversary after the protocol
completes, provided the adversary at the time of the run of the protocol could
not break the authentication scheme.
Applications wishing to achieve both long-term security (like QKD) and resis-
tance to randomness revelation (like eCK-secure classical AKE protocols) could
do so by running both protocols in parallel for each session, and then combining
the keys output by the two protocols together; if combined correctly, the result-
ing key would provide strong short-term security and strong long-term security.
This approach is being used by QKD implementers, such as commercial QKD
vendor ID Quantique.11
5 Conclusions
We have presented a model for key establishment which incorporates both clas-
sical key agreement and quantum key distribution. Our model can accommodate
a wide range of practical and theoretical scenarios and can serve as a common
framework in which to compare relative security properties of different protocols.
A key aspect of our model is that restrictions on values the adversary can com-
promise are not specified by the model but by the output of the protocol. Using
our model, we were able to provide a formal argument for the short-term and
11 http://www.idquantique.com/images/stories/PDF/cerberis-encryptor/
cerberis-specs.pdf
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long-term security of BB84 in the multi-user setting while using computationally
secure authentication.
The ability to compare various classical and quantum protocols in our model
has allowed us to identify an important distinction between existing classical
and quantum key exchange protocols. At a high level, classical protocols can
provide more assurances against online adversaries who can leak or infiltrate in
certain ways, but in the long run may be insecure against potential future ad-
vances. Current quantum protocols provide assurances against somewhat weaker
online adversaries but retain secrecy indefinitely, even against future advances
in computing technology.
Since in our model the relative strength of a fresh session is specified by the
conditions given in the output vector, an interesting open problem would be to
use our model develop a quantum key distribution protocol which does retain its
security attributes in the short- and long-terms even if some random values were
known before the run of the protocol. Also of interest is how to best combined
keys from both quantum and classical key exchange protocols run in parallel.
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